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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. A-123 (84-320) 
NATIONAL FARMERS UNION INSURANCE COMPA-
NIES ET AL., PETITIONERS v. CROW TRIBE 
OF I;:u..o~~~~ 
ber 10 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, Circuit Justice. 
Applicants National Fanners Union Insurance Companies 
and Lodge Grass School District No. 27 request that I stay 
the mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit which reversed the judgment of the United 
States District Court for the District of Montana. The latter 
court had enjoined the Crow. Tribe of Indians from executing 
against the applicants on a judgment rendered by the Crow 
Tribal Court. ~e C2~ of A~m.eals for the Ninth Circuit 
held, as I read its opiruon, tl!!.t litigants who seek to chal-
Jen~ercise of jurisdiction by an Indian Tribal Court in 
a ciVil i.di:on have no federal court remedy of any kind. I 
have concluded that four Members of this Court are likely to 
vote to grant the applicants' petition for certiorari, and that 
the appli ts have a reasonable probability for at least par-
tial sue ess on the merits t · Court grants certiorari. I 
have therefore decided that the temporary stay I earlier ~ 
granted on August 21, 1984, pending consideration of a re- 0' 
sponse, should be continued until this Court disposes of the 
applicants' petition for certiorari which was filed on August 
29th. 
In May, 1981, Leroy Sage, a Crow Indian school child, was 
struck by an uninsured motorcyclist on the property owned 
by applicant School District. The school is located on land 
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tion, but the land is owned by the State of Montana in fee 
subject to a reserved mineral interest in the Tribe. Sage 
sustained a broken leg, and filed suit against the School Dis-
trict in Crow Tribal Court. 
Dexter Falls Down served process for Sage upon Wesley 
Falls Down; Wesley was a member of the school board. 
Wesley did not notify anyone of the summons and a default 
judgment for $153,000 was entered against the school three 
weeks later in Tribal Court. Actual medical bills carne to 
$3,000. Petitioners became aware of the suit when the 
Tribal Court mailed a copy of the judgment to the school. 
Instead of seeking review of the default judgment in Tribal 
Court, applicants filed suit in the United States District 
Court for the District of Montana, alleging that the Tribal 
Court's exercise of jurisdiction violated Due Process and the 
Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U. S. C. § 1302, et seq. (1982). 
Petitioners sought a pennanent injunction against the execu-
tion of the Tribal Court judgment. 
The District Court held that petitioners' complaint, based 
on federal common law, stated a claim under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1331 (1982). National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. 
Crow Tribe of Indians, 360 F. Supp. 213, 214-15 (D. Mont. 
1983). The District Court held that the Tribal Court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over Sage's claim, because the 
land upon which the court had occurred was not Indian land, 
and the defendants were not tribal members. The District 
Court relied on our decision in Montana v. United States, 450 
U. S. 544, 565-66 (1981) in reaching this conclusion. 
The Tribe appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 1 A 
Circuit, and that court reversed over a partial dissent. Na- V\ 
tional Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indi-
ans, 736 F. 2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1984). The Court of Appeals 
reasoned on the authority of one of its prior decisions that 
~
"Indian tribes are not constrained by the provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment." It went on to determine that 
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Act, 25 U. S. C. § 1301 et seq. and that § 1302(8) of this Act 
requires that tribal courts exercise their jurisdiction in a 
manner consistent with due process and equal protection. 
But the court then concluded that since Congress had ex-
pressly limited federal court review of a claimed violation of 
the ICRA to a single remedy-the writ of habeas corpus-
there could be no federal court review of any tribal court ex-
ercise of jurisdiction in a civil case. The Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit relied in part on our decision in Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 66-70 (1977) to reach 
this conclusion. The Court of Appeals recognized that our 
decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 
191 (1978) had relied on principles of federal common law to 
determine whether a tribal court had exceeded its jurisdic-
tion, but decided that our opinion the same term in Santa 
Clara Pueblo, supra, suggested a restriction on federal court 
review of Indian tribal jurisdiction as a result of the Indian 
Civil Rights Act. The Court of Appeals observed in a foot-
note that "should Sage seek to enforce his default judgment · 
in the courts of Montana, National may, of course, challenge 
the Tribal Court's jurisdiction in the collateral proceedings. 
See generally Durfee v. Duke, 375 U. S. 106 (1963)." 736 F. 
2d 1320, 1324 n. 5. 
It is clear from proceedings in this case subsequent to the 
handing dOwn of the opinion of the Court of Appeals that the ,..-----..-
respondents in this case have no intention of resorting to any 
s~roc eaiilg§ in order to eruorce the judgment of 
the Crow Tri al ourt. ter e suance of the man ate of 
the ~ppeals, tribal officials, at the behest of re-
spondent Sage, seized 12 computer terminals, other com-
puter equipment, and a truck from the school district. The 
basis for this seizure was said to be the Tribal Court judg-
ment, and no state process was invoked. 
If the Court of Appeals is correct in the conclusions whicpt'n 
it drew in its opinion, the state of the law respecting revie~ 
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indeed anomalous. The Court of Appeals may well be cor-
rect that tripal ~ourts are not constrained by the Due Process 
or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment; 
long ag:o, this Court said in United States v. Kagama, 118 
U. S. 375, 379 (1886), and repeated the statement as recently 
as Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191, 211 
(1978): 
"Indians are within the geographical limits of the United 
States. · The soil and people within these limits are 
under the political control of the Government of the 
United States, or the States of the Union. There exists 
in the broad domain of a sovereignty but these two." 
l 
But if because only the national and state governments ex-
ercise true sovereignty, and are therefore subject to the com-
mands of the Fourteenth Amendment, I cannot believe that 
Indian tribal courts are nonetheless free to exercise their 
jurisdiction in a manner prohibited by the decisions of this 
Court, and that a litigant who is the subject of such an exer-
cise of jurisdiction has-nowhere at--all to turn for relief from a 
conceded excess. -Every final decision of the highest court of 
a state in which such a decision may be had is subject to re-
view by this Court on either certiorari or appeal. 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1257 (1982). Every decision of a United States District 
Court or of a court of appeals is reviewable by this Court 
either by way of appeal or by certiorari. ld., §§ 1252-54; 
cf. § 1291. If the courts of the states, which in common with 
the national government exercise the only true sovereignty 
exercised within our Nation, Kagama, supra, are to have 
their judgments reviewed by this Court on a claim of errone-
ous decision of a federal question, it is anomalous that no fed-
eral court, to say nothing of a state court, may review a judg-
ment of an Indian tribal court which likewise erroneously 
decides a federal question as to the extent of its jurisdiction. 
See Montana v. United States, supra. It may be that Con-
gress could provide for such a result, but I have a good deal 
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Our decision in Santa Claro Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 
49 (1978), which the Court of Appeals read to support its con-
clusion, raised the question of whether a federal court could 
pass on the validity of an Indian Tribe's ordinance denying 
membership to the children of certain female tribal members. 
We held that the Indian Civil Rights Act, supra, did not 
imply a private cause of action to redress violations of the 
statutory Bill of Rights contained in the Act, and that there-
fore the validity of the tribal ordinance regulating member-
ship could not be reviewed in federal court. It seems to me 
that this holding, relating as it did to the relationship be-
tween the right of a Tribe to regulate its own membership 
and the claims of those who had been denied membership, is 
quite distinguishable from a claim on the part of a non-Indian 
that a tribal court. has exceeded the bounds of tribal jurisdic-
tion as enunciated in such decisions of this Court as Montana 
v. United States, supra. As JUSTICE WHITE pointed out in 
his dissent in that case, 436 U. S. 72-73, "the declared pur-
pose of the Indian Civil Rights Act . . . is 'to ensure that the 
American Indian is afforded the broad constitutional rights 
secured to other Americans.' But as the Court also pointed 
out in its opinion, Congress entertained the additional pur-
pose of promoting 'the well-established federal "policy'' of 
furthering Indian self-Government."' 436 U. S. 49, 62. 
The facts as well as the holding of Santa Claro Pueblo, 
supra, satisfy me that Congress' concern in enacting the In-
dian Civil Rights Act was to enlarge the rights of individual 
Indians as against the Tribe while not unduly infringing on 
the right of tribal self-government. The fact that no private 
civil cause of action is to be implied under the Indian Civil 
Rights Act, Santa Claro Pueblo, supra, does not to my mind 
foreclose the likelihood that federal jurisdiction may be in-
voked by one who claims to have suffered from an excess be-
yond federally prescribed jurisdictional limits of an Indian 
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Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91, 99-100 (1972). 
We said in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, supra: 
"'Indian law' draws principally on the treaties drawn and 
executed by the Executive Branch and legislation passed 
by Congress. These instruments, which beyond their 
actual text form the backdrop for the intricate web of ju-
dicially made Indian law, cannot be interpreted in isola-
tion but must be read in light of the common notions of 
the day and the assumptions of those who drafted them." 
I think a fair reading of all of our case law on this subject 
could lead to the conclusion that even though the Indian Civil 
Rights Act affords no private civil cause of action to one 
claiming a violation of its terms, "Indian law'' as of the time 
that law was enacted afforded a basis for review of tribal 
court judgments claimed to be in excess of Tribal Court 
jurisdiction. 
Respondents insist that under Rule 44.2 of this Court a su-
persedeas bond should have accompanied applicant's request 
for a stay. That rule provides: 
"If the stay is to act as a supersedeas, a supersedeas 
bond shall accompany the motion and shall have such 
surety or sureties as said judge, court or justice may 
require., 
I do not think that the rule is by its terms applicable to this 
case. The term "supersedeas" to me suggests the order of 
an appellate court having authority to review on direct ap-
peal the judgment which is superseded. All of the proceed-
ings in the various federal courts in this case have, of course, 
sought no direct review of the Tribal Court judgment, which 
simply is not provided for by statute at all, but collateral re-
lief. The District Court did not review the judgment of the 
Indian Tribal Court by way of appeal, but instead enjoined its 
enforcement. 
It may well be that under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure respondents would have a plausible argument to make 
( 
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to the District Court that an injunction bond serving some-
what the same purposes as a supersedeas bond should be re-
quired by that court so long as its injunction remains in 
effect. Whether such a bond should be required of either 
party in this case, and whether in particular it should be re-
quired of applicant Lodge Grass School District No. 27 in 
view of the fact that apparently under Montana law a public 
body is not required to post a supersedeas bond in a state 
court proceeding, is an issue best left in the first instance to 
the District Court. 
As to whether, if I am right in thinking that this Court may 
well decide that Tribal Court judgments are subject to fed-
eral court review for claims of jurisdictional excess, appli-
cants would necessarily prevail, I express no opinion. The 
District Court held in their favor on this point, but the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found no necessity for reach-
ing it since it held that there was no federal jurisdiction to 
consider it. The District Court in its opinion quoted F. Co-
hen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 253 (1982 Ed.), to the 
effect that "the extent of Tribal civil jurisdiction over the 
non-Indian is not fully determined." The District Court, in 
reaching the conclusion it did, relied on the following lan-
guage from our opinion in United States v. Montana: 
"To be sure, Indian Tribes retain inherent sovereign 
power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over 
non-Indians on the Reservations, even on non-Indian fee 
lands. A Tribe may regulate, through taxation, licens-
ing, or other means, the activities of non-members who 
enter consensual relationships with the Tribe or its mem-
bers, through commercial dealings, contracts, leases, or 
other arrangements. A Tribe may also retain inherent 
power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-
Indians on fee lands within its reservation when the con-
duct threatens or has some direct effect on the political 
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare 
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The court concluded that exercise of tribal jurisdiction over 
an injury to a tribal member occurring on non-Indian owned 
fee land within the boundaries of the Reservation was not 
within the description of Indian tribal jurisdiction. I express 
no opinion as to what the correct answer to this inquiry may 
be. I do think its correct decision is of far less importance 
than the correct decision of the more fundamental question of ~ 
whether there is any federal court review available to non-
Indians for excesses of Tribal Court jurisdiction. 
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November 21, 1984, Conference 
List 3, Sheet 1 
No. 84-320 
Nat'l~s Un. Ins. 
Co. et: al. ~ --
v. ~ 
Crow Trib~
Cert to CA9 (Wright [cone.& 
dis.], Anderson, Fletcher) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: The CA9 held below that there is no federal 
court remedy for non-Indian litigants who seek to challenge the 
exercise of civil jurisdiction by an Indian tribal court. In an 
in-chambers opinion granting petrs' ap lication for a stay of the 
CA9's mandate pending this Court's r 
'--- Gsrru.d::- CA9 ""~ have ma.de. a. 
~sd.lc .. lc·oV\_~ ~~. 
. . - . . . .. LtrutQ 
ing on the petn for certio-
11 0 6 ..w-; boJ c...el.U\X 
- 2 -
'' I rari, Justice Rehnquist reviewed the facts and the legal basis 
for the CA9 opinion and concluded that four Justices would be 
likely to vote to grant this petn for certiorari. National Farm-
ers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, No. A-123 
(slip op. September 10, 1984) (copy attached). 
This case is straight-1 ined with R. J. Wi 11 iams Co. v. Fort 
Belknap Housing Authority, No. 83-1811. The Williams case, on 
which the CA9 relied in part in its decision in this case, is the 
subject of a previously circulated and thorough pool memo. A 
copy of that pool memo is also attached. The petrs in Williams 
have subsequently moved to consolidate consideration of their 
case with National Farmers Union; the motion for consolidation is 
the subject of a separate accompanying memo. 
( 2. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: Petr Lodge Grass School Dis-
tr ict No. 27, a Montana governmental unit, operates a school 
within the boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation on land ced-
ed to the state by resp Crow Tribe of Indians. Petr National 
Farmers Union Insurance Companies issued a liability insurance 
policy to the school district. 
In May, 1981, resp Leroy Sage, a student at the school, was 
struck by a motorcycle in the school parking lot. Through his 
guardian, Resp Flora Not Afraid, Sage brought a negligence suit 
against the school district in resp Crow Tribal Court. Process 
was served on the chairman of the school board, who failed to 
notify the other members. The Crow Tribal Court subsequently 
( 
entered a default judgment for Sage in the amount of $153,000. 




Rather than filing a motion to set aside the default judgment in 
Crow Tribal Court pursuant to the Crow Rules of Civil Procedure, 
petrs sought injunctive relief in U.S. District Court on the 
grounds that the tribal court's exercise of jurisidiction violat-
ed due process and the Indian Ci vi 1 Rights Act ( "ICRA") , 25 
u.s.c. §1302. 
The DC (Battin, C.J., D. Mont.) ruled for the petrs, and on 
December 29, 1982, entered a permanent injunction precluding en-
forcement of the Tribal Court judgment. Petn at 14a, 360 F.Supp. 
at 213. Judge Battin reasoned that he had jurisdiction under 28 
u.s.c. §1331 to determine whether the Tribal Court had exceeded 
the lawful limits of its jurisdiction in entering a default judg-
ment against the petrs. Citing Montana v. United States, 450 
u.s. 544 (1981), the DC concluded that federal authority to de-
termine the extent of tribal sovereignity is a matter of federal 
common law. And citing Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 
91 (1972), the DC concluded that federal question jurisdiction 
under §1331 can be based on questions of federal common law. 
Petn at 17a. On the merits, the DC concluded that the tribal 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the defendants 
were non-Indians and the accident took place on non-Indian land. 
Judge Battin concluded that the proper forum for this tort claim 
was Montana state court. Petn at 24a. In light of these hold-
ings, the DC found it unnecessary to reach petrs claims under the 
ICRA. Petn at 18a. 
On July 3, 1984, the CA9 reversed the DC in a brief opinion 





er's opinion noted that the Circuit's previous decision in R.J. 
Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Authority, 719 F.2d 979 (CA9 
1983), "held that a complaint challenging a tribal court's asser-
tion of jurisdiction over a non-Indian defendant in a civil suit 
stated no federal claim for relief." Petn at 4a. Finding Wil-
liams controlling, the panel reversed Judge Battin. A subsequent 
portion of Judge Fletcher's opinion, labelled "Discussion", noted 
that (1) due process and equal protection claims against Indian 
tribal courts do not arise under the Constitution because Indian 
tribes are not constrained by the provisions of the Fourth Amend-
ment (citing Williams); (2) although Indian tribes are required 
by ICRA to exercise their powers in a manner consistent with due 
process and equal protection, federal court review of alleged 
ICRA violations is limited to the remedy of a writ of habeas cor-
pus (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978)). 
The CA9 refused to recognize a civil cause of action at federal 
common law to review alleged improprieties in the exercise of 
j ur isd iction by tribal courts. Judge Fletcher noted that this 
holding made it unnecessary to reach the question of whether 
petrs had exhausted their available remedies in Crow Tribal 
Court. Petn at 7a n.4. 
Judge Wright dissented in part and concurred in the result. 
Petn at 8a. He would hold that the petrs stated a federal common 
law cause of action, but would dismiss their case because they 
had failed to exhaust tribal court remedies. First, Judge Wright 
noted that Santa Clara Pueblo and other cases cited by the major-





mon law jurisdiction to review a tribal court's exercise of ju-
risdiction in a civil case. He noted that cases permitting re-
view of tribal regulatory decisions on that grounds, see, e.g., 
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 u.s. 130 (1982), should 
logically extend to review of the exercise of jurisdiction by a 
tribal court. Second, Judge Wright noted that the Williams deci-
sion did not control in this case because petr there did not as-
seit federal common law as a basis for jurisdiction. Third, 
Judge Wright noted that the effect of the majority's ruling would 
be to make the Crow Tribal Court the final arbiter of its civil 
jurisdiction. Finally, he concluded that the case should never-
theless be dismissed because petrs had failed to exhaust avail-
able tribal remedies under the Crow Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Because petrs attempted to circumvent the tribal court system by 
suing immediately in federal court, Judge Wright would deny them 
relief. 
After the CA9 opinion was issued, resp Sage seized various 
assets of the resp school district, including a truck and some 
computer terminals, pursuant to tribal court process. A judicial 
sale of the property was authorized by the tribal court for Au-
gust 23, 1984. On August 22, 1984, petrs for the first time en-
tered an appearance in tribal court and moved to set aside the 
default judgment. Crow Tribe Resp Brief at la. Pursuant to Crow 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the tribal court then stayed the sale 
and ordered petrs to post a surety bond pending a decision on the 
motion. A hearing on the motion was scheduled for September 19, 





the CA9 mandate. National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow 
Tribe of Indians, No. A-123 (slip op. September 10, 1984) (copy 
attached). The tribal court accordingly stayed the sale indefi-
nitely, Crow Tribe Resp Brief at Sa. The ~ribal court went ahead 
with the hearing on the motion to set aside the default judgment, 
but petrs refused to attend. Crow Tribe Resp Brief at 13a. 
3. CONTENTIONS: In addition to the petn, resp briefs have 
been filed by the Crow Tribe of Indians and by resps Sage and Not 
Afraid. Three amicus briefs have been filed on behalf of ten 
states and Glacier County, Montana, supporting the petn. Petrs 
also filed a reply brief on November 8, 1984. 
Petrs contend that the CA9 opinion has far-reaching conse-
quences in denying federal courts any power to protect non-
Indians from abuse of tribal court jurisdiction. United States 
v. Montana, supra, 450 u.s. at 564-66, suggested that tribal 
court civil jurisdiction over non-Indians would be limited to 
those cases involving non-Indians who enter into consensual rela-
tions with the tribe and to protection of the political integri-
ty, economic security, or health or welfare of the tribe. The 
CA9 opinion forecloses any contraint on tribal jurisidiction de-
spite the Montana suggestion that such jurisdiction is limited. 
The CA9 opinion should be promptly reviewed because of the perva-
sive involvement of non-Indians -- and particularly non-Indian 
governmental units like petr -- on Indian reservations. Montana 
alone operates 47 school districts on Indian reservations, and 
all may be subject to unreviewable assertions of civil jurisdic-





Clara Pueblo, supra, 436 U.S. at 51-52, addressed only the role 
of federal causes of action to enforce the ICRA in the context of 
an inter-tribal dispute, and not the existence of a federal corn-
rnon law cause of action to challenge tribal court civil jurisdic-
tion over a non-Indian. 
The Amici contend that the CA9 opinion is incorrect and 
threatens the relationships between Indian tribes and state gov-
ernrnents and private businesses. An amicus brief filed on behalf 
of nine states1 notes that each of the states and their subdivi-
sions provide a variety of governmental services within Indian 
reservations. They are concerned that, without a federal common 
law cause of action to challenge a tribe's improper assertion of 
civil jurisdiction over state agencies, state property and serv-
ices on reservations will be endangered. The states further note 
that the federally developed doctrine of tribal sovereignity can-
not be construed to authorize unreviewable assertions of civil 
jurisdiction over non-Indians. In a separate amicus brief, the 
State of Washington notes that 16,000 non-Indian Washington citi-
zens reside on Indian reservations in that state, and are provid-
ed state services by a variety of governmental entities, includ-
ing 40 school districts. These persons have no voice in tribal 
affairs, yet under the CA9 holding they will have no way to chal-
lenge the tribe's assertion of civil jurisdiction over them. In 
a third amicus brief, Glacier County, Montana argues that the 
1Montana, Arizona, Minnesota, North Dakota, North Carolina, 




Blackfeet Tribal Court has recently enjoined the County Water and 
Sewer District from terminating water or sewage service to non-
paying members of the tribe. Under the CA9 decision below, the 
County argues, this sort of injunction will be unreviewable in 
any other court. The County provides sewer service and . a variety 
of other services on the reservation by state mandate rather than 
by choice. 
Resp Crow Tribe contends that the CA9 opinion is correct as 
a matter of law and that review is particularly unwarranted be-
cause the petrs have failed to exhaust the significant remedies 
available to them in the tribal court. Petr cites Santa Clara 
Pueblo, supra, 436 u.s. at 63, for the proposition that federal 
review of tribal court assertions of civil jurisdiction must be 
precluded in order to protect tribal sovereignity from undue in-
terference. Crow Tribe Resp at 6, 13-16. The bulk of this resp 
brief argues that petr s intentionally circumvented the tribal 
court in seeking an injunction in federal court prior to attempt-
ing to have the default judgment set aside in Crow Tribal Court. 
Sensible not ions of comity and respect for tribal sovere igni ty 
suggest that, even if there is a federal common law cause of ac-
tion to review tribal exercise of jurisdiction, non-Indians be 
required to exhaust tribal court remedies before appealing to a 
federal court. Crow Tribe Resp at 7-13. The tribe finally sug-
gests that, in the event the petn is granted, the Court should 
not reach the merits of whether the tribal court has jurisdiction 





Resps Sage and Not Afraid repeat arguments made by resp Crow 
Tribe concerning the Santa Clara Pueblo case and petrs' failure 
to exhaust tribal court remedies. They emphasize that petrs' 
resort to federal court without any appearance in tribal court 
has caused Sage and Not Afraid to incur three years of delay in 
obtaining relief on their claim and more than $45,000 in legal 
fees. Sage and Not Afraid seek leave to proceed in forma paupe-
ris, and they have filed an appropriate affidavit indicating they 
have no assets and are unemployed. 
Petrs Reply Brief argues that this Court should review both 
the question of whether there exists a federal cause of action to 
review tribal court exercise of jurisdiction and the question of 
whether tribal court jurisdiction was proper in this case. Petrs 
note that the CA9 opinion held that failure to exhaust tribal 
court remedies was irrelevant, since petrs could not have ob-
tained federal review even if they had exhausted tribal court 
remedies. Resps' "exhaustion" argument accordingly does not 
lessen the merit of the petn. 
4. DISCUSSION: The Court should grant the petn on both 
questions presented. The CA9 ruling -- that federal courts can 
never review the exercise of civil jurisdiction by a tribal court 
over a non-Indian -- is unfortunate and was clearly unnecessary 
to decide the case. The CA9 reading of Santa Clara Pueblo ex-
tends that case far beyond reason or the Court's apparent intent. 
Judge Wright's partial dissent is eminently reasonable and sug-
gests an appropriate accommodation of the need to protect the 
integrity of tribal court proceedings and the need to protect 
( 
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non-Indians against assertions of civil jurisdiction by tribal 
courts. By resorting to federal court prior to seeking to vacate 
the default judgment in tribal court, petrs circumvented estab-
lished procedures in that court and successfully delayed resolu-
tion of the merits of their claims for more than two years. Had 
the CA9 merely rejected petrs suit on the grounds of non-
exhaustion, this case would probably not be certworthy. 
But because the CA9 instead announced that tribal courts can 
define their own jurisdiction over non-Indians without any feder-
al court review, this Court will have to straighten out the mess. 
The case lends itself to elucidation of both a federal common law 
action challenging tribal court jurisdiction and a requirement 
that litigants exhaust tribal remedies before resort to federal 
court. As noted in the accompanying memo, I further recommend 
that the Williams case, which is straight-lined with this one, be 
held pending resolution of this case. The CA9 reasoning and re-
sult in Williams are less outrageous than in this case, and can 
be distinguished since petrs there failed to invoke federal com-
mon law. Nevertheless, any opinion in this case may require the 
CA9 to reevaluate Williams. 
I recommend a GRANT. 
There are two responses, three amicus briefs, and a reply. 
November 13, 1984 Syverud opn in petn 
November 21, 1984 
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MEMO TO FILE 
This case presents the following question: 
.. Whether the Tribal Court of the Crow 
Indian reservation has jurisdiction over claims 
that involve the State of Montana (or its 
subdivisions}, that arise on State-owned land, 
and that occur in connection with activities 
that are compelled or encouraged by State and 
Federal law or policy ... 
The facts in this case are unusal. Leroy Sage, a 
member of the Crow Tribe and a minor, was injured on the 
parking lot of Lodge Grass Elementary School, a public 
school located on land owned by the state, but within the 
exterior boundaries of the Crow Reservation. Through a 
guardian, Sage brought suit against the school district in 
a Crow Tribal Court, claiming substantial damages. 
Process was served on the School Board Chairman who, for 
unknown reasons, failed to notify anyone that a suit had 




insurer, National Farmers Union Insurance Company, had 
notice and therefore a default judgment of $153,000 was 
taken 21 days after service of process. 
This suit was instituted in federal court to obtain 
an injunction against the execution of the default 
judgment. Following a hearing on defendant's motion to 
dismiss, the DC granted a permanent injunction against any 
t.:t 
execut}1on of the Tribal Court judgment, holding that ~s 
court lacked "subject matter jurisdiction over the tort 
that was the basis of the default judgment". 
The Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit reversed the 
DC, and held that since a Tribal Court was the first and 
last arbiter of its own jurisdiction, a federal court had 
no jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. §1331 to intrude upon the 
"ajudicatory jurisdiction asserted by Tribal Courts even 
in a civil tort action involving non-Indians, and arising 
upon on-Indian lands located within the boundaries of an 
Indian Reservation." 
Petitioners argue that the "ability of states to 
conduct their governmental functions in an orderly fashion 
is at stake" in this case. The Court of ~ppeals erred in 
holding that Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 u.s. 49, 
makes a Tribal Court the first and last arbiter of its own 
3. 
jurisdiction in tort cases - even those arising on state-
owned land and involving state operated activities such as 
the school district. Petitioners say that the question at 
issue is "not governed by any single federal statute, but 
is based on federal common law. A claim based on federal 
common law is included in 'laws' of the United States for 
purpose of federal jurisdiction under §1331. Illinois v. 
City of Milwaukee, 406 u.s. 91. Petitioners briefs cites 
CA9 cases (apparently in conflict with its present 
decision) that recognize/ the right of federal courts to 
decide questions whether a Tribe has exceeded its 
jurisdiction over non-Indians. Even though there is no 
federal statute defining the extent of Tribal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians, federal court jurisdiction exists under 
§1333, based on principles ~ of federal common 
law. 
Respondents argue that the "power to decide federal 
common law questions is limited" generally by the intent 
of Congress with respect to Indian affairs. "Congress 
'" intends to foster Indian self-government by forbidding a 
district court, in effect, to become a appellate court 
over the Tribal Court. A federal district court has no 
authority to use the injunction power to cripple and 
4. 
nulify the orderly functions of the Tribal Court system • 
..r 
In any event, respondent say that federal court review is 
1\ 
not available until Tribal remedies are exhausted. All of 
these principles, it is said, were violated by the 
district court in this case. 
~n~history of the "Crow Nation" makes clear 
that the Tribe held and properly exercised jurisdiction 
over torts of non-Indians against Crows from the earliest 
times until the commencement of this case. The tort in 
this case was committed by a non-Indian riding a 
motorcycle that hit the plaintiff. 
As Annmar ie knows from our work on Oneida, I am no 
authority on Indian law. If there is no federal statute 
directly conferring jurisdiction on the federal court, I 
would think that federal common law includes - or should 
include the authority of a federal court to enjoin 
enforcement of a judgment by the Tribal Court against a 
local subdivision of the State of Montana. Putting it 
differently, I would doubt that a Tribal Court has 
jurisdiction to impose a judgment on the state or one of 
(/Yo-
its political subdivisions _yf a tort against an Indian 
committed by a non-Indian on state-owned property. Bill 
Rehnquist, in granting a stay in this case, apparently 
5. 
said that the decision of CA9 appears to leave the state 
and its insurer with "no federal court remedy of any 
kind". 
It seems to me that the question is somewhat clearer 
if viewed in terms of the jursidiction of the Tribal 
Court, rather than that of the federal district court. My 
thoughts are entirely tentative, and I will be intersted 
in the views of my law clerk. 
LFP, JR. 
i 




To: Justice Powell April 5, 1985 
From: Annmarie 
Re : No • 8 4-3 2 0 
Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Co. et al v. Crow Tribe et al 
Questions Presented 
(1) Does a federal court have jurisdiction to enjoin 
Indian tribal court proceedings against a 
ground that the tribal court has exceeded its 
(2) Should a non-Indian plaintiff be 
non-Indian on the 
jurisdiction? ;1;:-~ 
required to e~ 
tribal court remedies before challenging the jurisdiction of the 
tribal court in federal court? 
(3) Did the tribal court exceed its authority by 
exercising civil jurisdiction over non-Indians in an action to 
2. 
redress personal injuries to a member of the tribe whose injuries 
allegedly were caused by the negligence of school district 
officials on State-owned land within the tribe's reservation? 
~~~--~~~)~~~~)/~ 
. Background C. f   .. 
In May 1982, Leroy Sage, a minor and member of the Crow 
Tribe, was injured by a motorcycle on the grounds of a school 
operated by School District No. 27, a political subdivision of 
the State of Montana. Although the land on which the school was 
located is owned by the State, it is within a reservation held by 
the Crows. Sage's guardian sued the school district in the Crow 
tribal court seeking $3,000 in actual damages and $150,000 for 
pain and suffering. The complaint alleged that the school 
district was negligent in that the condition of the school 
parking lot was unsafe and that it was inadequately supervised 
during school hours. Process was served properly upon the 
chairman of the school district, who inexplicably failed to 
notify anyone else of the suit. As a result, in October, 1982, a 
default judgment in the amount of $153,000 was entered against 
the school district in the tribal court. 
~ ~~ On November 2, 1982, having received notice of this 
t"Q. L. J'udgment, fV the school district and its insurance company filed 
suit in federal district court alleging that the tribal court did ~ - ..-...... 
not have subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy. The~ 
f)t, DC agreed and permanently enjoined enforcement of the tribal 
court's judgment. On appeal, CA9 reversed, holding that a CJ4<1 
federal court cannot enjoin tribal court proceedings. Judge - --Wright concurred in the result on the ground that petrs should 
3. 
have exhausted their tribal court remedies before seeking 
intervention by the DC. 
On August 1, 1984, shortly after CA9's decision, the 
tribal court issued a writ of execution for the seizure of 
certain property of the school district. Sale of the property was 
scheduled for August 23. On August 22, the school district 
,1; ,, 
appeared in ~fi8s l court seeking to enjoin the sale and set aside 
the default judgment. On the same day, the tribal court 
postponed the sale and set a hearing to consider the motion to 
vacate the default judgment. At about the same time as its 
appearance in tribal court, the school district applied to 
Justice Rehnquist for an emergency stay of the sale. Justice 
· 'J-1 /( Rehnquist granted a temporary stay on August 21. On September 
'(J:v~~ lO, he continued the stay until the disposition of the school 
district's proceedings before this Court. Nine days later, the 
tribal court postponed ruling on the motion to vacate the default 
judgment until final disposition by this Court. 
Discussion 
I. Jurisdiction of the Federal DC. 
The DC held that it had jurisdiction to entertain petrs' -
action for injunctive relief under 28 u.s.c. §1331. In the DC's 
view, petrs raised a question of federal common law and this 
question was cognizable under §1331 under Illinois v. City of 
Milwaukee, 406 u.s. 91, 99-100 (1972}. In particular, the DC 
believed that petrs placed in issue "the extent of tribal court 
civil jurisdiction over non-Indians as developed by the Supreme 
Court in Montana v. United States, 450 u.s. 544 (1981} 
4. 
developments that are not drawn from any specific statute or 
treaty, but raise the overriding federal interest in determining 
the extent of tribal sovereignty and therefore form a part of 
federal common law." Pet. App. at 17a. 
I think this theory of jurisdiction is persuasive. As you 
noted in Oneida, regulation of, and relations with, Indian tribes ~ 
are matters exclusively within the power of the federal 
government. Indian tribes relinquished the absolute sovereignty 
they enjoyed as independent nations upon their incorporation into 
the United States. Accordingly, whatever judicial, legislative, 
-----------~----------or other authority Indian tribes retain is a matter of determined 
by federal law. This Court's decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish 
---'--' 
Indian Tribe, 435 u.s. 191 (1978), indicated that these retained 
powers are not limited only by the specific restrictions in 
treaties or congressional enactments. Indian tribes are 
prohibited as well from exercising those powers "inconsistent 
q ~ with their status." Id., at 208. Thus, I conclude that a 
~hallenge to~~ct~ tribal court raises a question 
~ of~ law. As the DC correctly noted, the Court held 
in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, supra, that causes of action 
based on federal common law arise under the laws of the United 
States for purposes of §1331 jurisdiction. 
The one nagging question I have about the jurisdiction of 
DC in this case is whether petrs really raised a question of 
federal common law in the DC. Their original complaint asserted ____ ____.. 
jurisdiction only on the basis of §1343 and 25 u.s.c. §1302 (the 
Indian Civil Rights Act or "ICRA"), although it was amended to 
5. 
allege jurisdiction under §1331 as well. Petrs' substantive 
claims read as follows: 
14. The defendants lack jurisdiction over non-
Indian fee land premises conducting business with 
substantial contracts [sic] outside the exterior 
boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation .. 
15. The attempted assertion of the jurisdiction 
over plaintiffs under the circumstances hereinabove 
described and by the procedures invoked by the 
defendants violate the provisions of 25 U. S.C. §1302 
and of the equal protection and due process clauses of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution 










The DC took paragraph 14 to assert a federal common law 
claim. I think it is more plausible to read paragraphs 14 and 15 -
together so that petrs actually assert only constitutional and 
ICRA claims. If petrs did raise only statutory and 
constitutional claims, the question of the DC's jurisdiction 
would require a different analysis. In particular, the Court 
would have to take account of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 
u.s. 49 (1978). Martinez reaffirmed that Indian tribes are 
"unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed 
specifically as limitations on federal or state authority," 
citing as examples the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id., at 
56. Martinez also held that the only relief federal courts may 
offer for violations of the ICRA's guarantees of equal protection 
and due process is that provided by the statute, namely the writ 
of habeas corpus. While Martinez could be distinguished because 
it involved a suit by an Indian against the Tribe, the case was 
not analyzed from this perspective below. Thus I'm not sure what 
the proper disposition would be at this point if the Court 
~ .b-0 ci- c/1--61 
~~)~ 
decided that the common law basis for jurisdiction was not~ 
....., 
presented. 
Since the litigation has come this far, however, it 
probably makes sense simply to accept the DC's characterization 
of paragraph 14 as raising a question of federal common law. ~ 
This interpretation is not unreasonable and CA9 reached the 
question of jurisdiction over a common law cause of action. Thus 
I think the Court probably ~hould do so as well. 
Finally, I should address the CA9 majority's theory for 
why the DC does not have jurisdiction over a common law challenge 
to the extent of tribal court jurisdiction. The majority 
reasoned that federal common law is an unusual course, to be 
invoked sparingly. Since this Court held that Congress' 
"manifest purpose" in adopting the ICRA was to limit intrusions 
by the federal courts on tribal adjudication, Martinez, 436 u.s., 
at 67-70, it would violate federal policy to recognize a common C~~ 
law cause of action to enjoin tribal court proceedings. The 
court believed that federal courts should decline to recognize 
"causes of action" in addition to the limited remedies provided 
in the ICRA. l 
1The majority unpersuasively attempts to distinguish its 
own prior dec1s1ons recogn1z1ng the right of federal courts to 
rule on claims that tribal courts exceeded their jurisdiction. 
According to the majority, those cases involved challenges to the 
civil "regulatory" jurisdiction of the tribes and not their 
"adjudicatory" jurisdiction. Not only do the cases fail to__Jllake 
this distinction, but I don't think the distinction makes any 
sense. In tne previous cases, 'fhere was an lawsuit penaing in 
ttThal court. The policy of not intruding on tribal courts was 
implicated as much in these challenges~"regulatory" authority as 




This reasoning is not persuasive, I believe, for a number 
of reasons. The ICRA does not purport to define the civil 
jurisdiction of the tribal courts. As a result, I don't think 
there is any plausible way to read the ICRA to preempt the common 
law of tribal court jurisdiction. The Court's decision in 
Oliphant makes clear that the extent of the tribal court's civil 
jurisdiction is at least in part a question of federal common 
law, and nothing in the ICRA changes that. 
~ ~ The question of appropriate relief is a separate matter. 
~e provided by the statute is availi>ble "to test 
the legality of [a person's] detention by order of an Indian 
tribe." I think it is clear that this remedy is not intended to 
apply to civil proceedings. There is no reason to limit relief 
----------------~-~ /"' 
for common law wrongs to· statutory remedies addressed to a 
different problem. Thus even if the habeas remedy of the ICRA is 
the exclusive remedy for statutory violations, this doesn't mean 
that petrs raising a common law cause of action are limited to 
this remedy. 
In sum, I would find that the DC had jurisdiction under 
'--------------~----~------~------~-------
§1331 to consider petrs' federal common law claim that the tribal 
court exceeded its jurisdiction. 
~-------------~--------
II. Exhaustion 
Although I believe that the federal court has jurisdiction 
in this challenge to adjudicatory authority. More significantly, 
as Judge Wright notes in concurrence, there is no reason for 
federal court jurisdiction to turn on the source of the tribal 
rule being adjudicated in tribal court. 
~~~~ 
a-k-~ ~1-J.:. 
argument that the DC~ 
exercising its jurisdiction until 
in this case, I think there is a very stron 
should have abstained from 
-------~- ------ __.__,_,_, .... 
petrs exhausted their tribal court remedies. As this Court 
recognized, Congress has sought to strengthen tribal institutions 
and intended tribal courts to promote tribal self-government. 
Martinez, 436 u.s. 49. It is hard to think of an action more 
likely to insult and undermine tribal courts than a federal court 
injunction against its proceedings, granted to plaintiffs who 
never gave the tribal court the opportunity to rule on its own 
jurisdiction. As a matter of federal policy and comity, then, 
federal courts should hesitate to intervene in circumstances like 
these. 
As Judge Wright reasoned in his concurrence, exhaustion -need not be an inflexible requirement in this area of the law, 
but should be applied when there are meaningful tribal remedies 
available and exhaustion serves to promote comity and strengthen --
tribal institutions. In this case, such remedies are available. 
-----------Indeed, the tribal court was willing to entertain petrs 1 late 
motion to vacate the default judgment after CA9 1 s decision until 
the petrs sought Justice Rehnquist 1 s intervention. On balance, 
then, I think requi~ing petrs to exhaust tribal court remedies 
well serves federal policy. --------
III. Extent of Tribal Jurisdiction 
CA9 did not reach the question whether the tribal court 
had jurisdiction over the underlying tort case. Because I think 
exhaustion should be required in this case, I don 1 t think the 
9. 
Court need reach the question. I will offer some thoughts on the 
issue in case the Court does wish to address it. 
It is well established that tribal courts have some civil 
regulatory and "udicial jurisdiction over non-Indians on their 
reservations, even on non-Indian lands. Montana v. United -States, 450 u.s. 544, 565 (1981): Washington v. Confederated 
Colville Tribes, 447 u.s. 134 (1980): Williams v. Lee, 358 u.s. 
217, 223 (1959). This jurisdiction is "attributable in no way to 
any delegation of federal authority," United States v. Wheeler, 
435 u.s. 313, 328 (1978), but rather represents authority 
v 
retained by tribes despite their dependent status. In Montana v. 
United States, the Court laid out this description of the extent 
of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians on non-Indian lands 
within a reservation: 
"A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or 
other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter 
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, 
through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other~t~ 
arrangements. • A tribe may also retain inherent 
power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of 
non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when 
that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the 
political integrity, the economic security, or the 
health or welfare of the tribe." 450 u.s., at 566 
(citations omitted). 
The DC decided that a single tort did not involve the kind 
of tribal interests that are within the jurisdiction of the tribe 
to protect. Neither the DC nor petrs provide authority for this 
view. The SG argues strenuously that the tribal court does have __., 
jurisdiction. Since the allegation in the underlying suit is --that the school district was negligent in that it maintained 
dangerous conditions in the school parking lot, in the SG's view, 
10. 
the case implicates tribal health and welfare interests directly 
enough to warrant the exercise of its adjudicatory jurisdiction. 
I agree with the SG's conclusion. After all, I think that 
the tribe's interests are probably significant enough that it 
could regulate, at least to some extent, the school district's ___...., _...._ ~
operation of the parking lot. For example, the tribe probably 
could require the presence of a school crossing guard or special 
bus stops, just as it can require non-Indians to meet health and 
safety standards in the operation of their businesses on non-
Indian land within the reservation. Montana v. United States. 2 
Thus, if the Court reaches the question whether the tribal court 
had jurisdiction over the dispute, I would hold that it did. 
I 
Recommendation 
recommend~eversing CA9's holding that the DC was 
without jurisdiction to entertain petrs' complaint. I would hold 
that the@ DC should have abstained from exercising its 
jurisdiction, however, 
remedies. Likewise, I 
until petrs exhausted 
thi~this Court should 
their tribal 
refrain from 
passing on the question of the tribal court's jurisdiction until 
the tribal court has the opportunity to do so. 
2The regulatory authority of the tribe in this case is a 
little more complicated because the school is operated by "a 
political subdivision of the State of Montana." I don't think 
this affects the question of adjudicatory authority, however, 
because of the broad waiver of sovereign immunity adopted by 
statute in Montana. 
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From: Justice Stevens 
Circulated: _..:..;_:cM_AY_ 2_3 _19_8_S __ 
Recircu~ated: _______ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-320 
NATIONAL FARMERS UNION INSURANCE COMPA-
NIES AND LODGE GRASS SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 27, 
PETITIONERS v. CROW TRIBE OF INDIANS ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[May-, 1985] 
JUSTICE STEVENS d~livered the opinion for the Court. 
A member of the Crow Tribe of Indians filed suit against 
the Lodge Grass School District No. 27 (School District) in 
the Crow Tribal Court and obtained a default judgment. 
Thereafter, the School District and its insurer, National 
Farmers Union Insurance Companies (National), commenced 
this litigation in the District Court for the District of Mon-
tana; that court was persuaded that the Crow Tribal Court 
had no jurisdiction over a civil action against a non-Indian 
and entered an injunction against further proceedings in the 
Tribal Court. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that 
the District Court had no jurisdiction to enter such an injunc-
tion. We granted certiorari to consider whether the District 
Court properly entertained petitioners' request for an injunc-
tion under 28 U. S. C. § 1331. 
The facts as found by the District Court are not substan-
tially disputed. bn May 27, 1982, Leroy Sage, a Crow In-
dian minor, was struck by a motorcycle in the Lodge Grass 
Elementary School parking lot while returning from a school 
activity. The school has a student body that is 85% Crow 
Indian and is located within the boundaries of the Crow In-
dian Reservation. However, the land on which the school is 
located is owned by the State, with a mineral reservation 
held by the Crow Tribe. Through his guardian, Flora Not 
84-320--0PINION 
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Afraid, Sage initiated a lawsuit in the Crow Tribal Court 
against the School District, a political subdivision of the 
State, alleging damages of $153,000, including medical ex-
penses of $3,000 and pain and suffering of $150,000. 
On September 28, 1982, process was served by Dexter 
Falls Down on Wesley Falls Down, the Chairman of the 
School Board. For reasons that have not been explained, 
Wesley Falls Down failed to notify anyone that a suit had 
been filed. On October 19, 1982, a default judgment was 
entered pursuant to the rules of the Tribal Court, and on· 
October 25, 1982, Judge Roundface entered findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and a judgment for $153,000 against the 
School District. Sage v. Lodge Grass School District, 10 In-
dian L. Rep. 6019 (1982). A copy of that judgment was 
hand-delivered by Wesley Falls Down to the school principal 
who, in turn, forwarded it to National on October 29, 1982. 
On November 3, 1982, National and the School District 
(petitioners) filed a verified complaint and a motion for a tem-
porary restraining order in the District Court for the District 
of Montana. The complaint named as defendants the Crow 
Tribe of Indians, the Tribal Council, the Tribal Court, Judges 
of the Court and the Chairman of the Tribal Council. It de-
scribed the entry of the default judgment, alleged that a writ 
of execution might issue on the following day, and asserted 
that a seizure of school property would cause irreparable in-
jury to the School District and would violate the petitioners' 
constitutional and statutory rights. The District Court en-
tered an order restraining all the defendants "from attempt-
ing to assert jurisdiction over plaintiffs or issuing writs of 
execution out of Cause No. Civ. 82-287 of the Crow Tribal 
Court until this court orders otherwise." 1 
In subsequent proceedings, the petitioners filed an amend-
ment to their co¥lplaint, invoking 28 U. S. C. § 1331 as a 
' Certified Record, Document No. 6. 
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basis for federal jurisdiction, 2 and added Flora Not Afraid 
and Leroy Sage as parties defendant. After the temporary 
restraining order expired, a hearing was held on the defend-
ants' motion to dismiss the complaint and on the plaintiffs' 
motion for a preliminary injunction. On December 29, 1982, 
the District Court granted the plaintiffs a permanent injunc-
tion against any execution of the Tribal Court judgment. 
National Farmers Union Insurance Companies v. Crow 
Tribe of Indians of Montana, 560 F. Supp. 213, 218 (D. 
Mont. 1983). The basis "for the injunction was that the 
Crow Tribal Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over 
the tort that was the basis of the default judgment." I d., 
at 214. 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed. 736 F. 2d 1320 (1984). Without reaching the 
merits of petitioners' challenge to the jurisdiction of the 
Tribal Court, the majority concluded that the District Court's 
exercise of jurisdiction could not be supported on any con-
stitutional, statutory or common-law ground. I d., at 1322-
1323.3 One judge dissented in part and concurred in the re-
sult, expressing the opinion that petitioners stated a federal 
common-law cause of action involving a substantial federal 
2 !d., Document No. 14. In their original complaint, petitioners relied 
on 25 U .. S. C. § 1302 and on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 as bases for federal 
jurisdiction. 
3 The Court of Appeals believed that the petitioners' due process and 
equal protection claims had no merit because Indian tribes are not con-
strained by the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, al-
though recognizing that the Tribe is bound by the Indian Civil Rights Act, 
25 U. S. C. §§ 1301-1341, the Court of Appeals held that a federal court 
has no jurisdiction to enjoin violations of that Act. See Santa Clara 
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49 (1978). Finally, although the majority 
assumed that a complaint alleging that a Tribe had abused its regulatory 
jurisdiction would state a claim arising under federal common-law, it con-
cluded that a claim that a Tribe had abused its adjudicatory jurisdiction 
could not be recognized because Congress, by enacting the Indian Civil 
Rights Act, had specifically restricted federal court interference with 
Tribal Court proceedings to review on petition for habeas corpus. 
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question over which subject-matter jurisdiction was con-
ferred by 28 U. S. C. § 1331. He concluded, however, that 
the petitioners had a duty to exhaust their tribal court reme-
dies before invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court, and 
therefore concurred in the judgment directing that the com-
plaint be dismissed. /d., at 1324-1326.4 
I 
Section 1331 of the Judicial Code provides that a federal 
district court "shall have original jurisdiction of all civil 
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of 
the United States." 5 It is well settled that this statutory 
grant of "jurisdiction will support claims founded upon fed-
eral common law as well as those of a statutory origin." 6 
Federal common law as articulated in rules that are fashioned 
by court decisions are "laws" as that term is used in § 1331.7 
'After the District Court's injunction was vacated, tribal officials issued 
a writ of execution ol) August 1, 1984, and seized computer terminals, 
other computer equipment, and a truck from the School District. A sale of 
the property was scheduled for August 22, 1984. On that date, the School 
District appeared in the Tribal Court, attempting to enjoin the sale and to 
set aside the default judgment. Br. in Opp. App. 1a-9a. The Tribal 
Court stated that it could not addr~ss the default-judgment issue "without 
a full hearing, research, and briefs by counsel," id., at 4a; that it would 
consider a proper motion to set aside the default judgment; and that the 
sale should be postponed. Petitioners also proceeded before the Court of 
Appeals, which denied an emergency motion to recall the mandate on Au-
gust 20, 1984. The next day JUSTICE REHNQUIST granted the petitioners' 
application for a temporary stay. On September 10, 1984, he continued 
the stay pending disposition of the petitioners' petition for certiorari. 
-- U. S. -- (1984). On September 19, the Tribal Court entered an 
order postponing a ruling on the motion to set aside the default judgment 
until after final review by this Court. Br. in Opp. App. 15a. Subse-
quently, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stayed all proceedings 
in the District Court. On April 24, 1985, JuSTICE REHNQUIST denied an 
application to "dissolve" the Court of Appeals' stay. -- U. S. --
(1985). 
5 28 u. s. c. § 1331. 
6 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91, 100 (1972). 
7 See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 
392-393 (1959) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.); cf. 9ounty of Onieda v. Onieda 
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Thus, in order to invoke a federal district court's jurisdic-
tion under § 1331, it was not essential that the petitioners 
base their claim on a federal statute or a provision of the Con-
stitution. It was, however, necessary to assert a claim 
"arising under" federal law. As Justice Holmes wrote for 
the Court, a "suit arises under the law that creates the cause 
of action." 8 Petitioners contend that the right which they 
assert-a right to be protected against an unlawful exercise 
of tribal court judicial power-has its source in federal law 
because federal law defines the outer boundaries of an Indian 
tribe's power over non-Indians. 
As we have often noted, Indian tribes occupy a unique sta-
tus under our law. 9 At one time they exercised virtually 
unlimited power over their own members as well as those 
who were permitted to join their communities. Today, how-
ever, the power of the federal government over the Indian 
tribes is plenary. 1° Federal law, implemented by statute, by 
treaty, by administrative regulations, and by judicial deCi-
sions, provides significant protection for the individual, terri-
torial and political rights of the Indian tribes: The tribes 
also retain some of the inherent powers of the self-governing 
political communities that were formed long before Europe-
ans first settled in North America. lr 
Indian Tribe,- U.S.-,- (1985); Texas Industries v. Radcliff 
Mterials, 451 U. S. 630, 640 (1981); United States v. Little Lake Misere 
Land Co., 412 U. S. 580, 593-592 (1973); Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 
u. s. 64, 78-79 (1938). 
8 American Well Works v. Layne, 241 U. S. 257, 260 (1915). 
9 See, e. g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); United 
States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 557 (1975); cf. Turner v. United States, 
248 u. s. 354, 354-355 (1919). 
10 Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla, Rincon, San Pasqual, 
Pauma and Banks of Mission Indians,- U.S.-,- (1984) ("all 
aspects of Indian sovereignty are subject to defeasance by Congress"); 
Rice v. Rehner, 463 U. S. 713, 719 (1983); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. 
Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 143 (1980); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 
313, 323 (1978). 
11 White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 142 (1980); 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 55-56 (1978). 
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This Court has frequently been required to decide ques-
tions concerning the extent to which Indian tribes have re-
tained the power to regulate the affairs of non-Indians. 12 We 
have also been confronted with a series of questions concern-
ing the extent to which a tribe's power to engage in com-
merce has included an immunity from state taxation. 13 In all 
of these cases, the governing rule of decision has been pro-
vided by federal law. In this case the petitioners contend 
that the tribal court has no power to enter a judgment 
against them. Assuming that the power to resolve disputes 
arising within the territory governed by the Tribe was once 
an attibute of inherent tribal sovereignty, the petitioners, in 
essence, contend that the Tribe has to some extent been di-
vested of this aspect of sovereignty. More particularly, 
when they invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court under 
§ 1331, they must contend that federal law has curtailed the 
powers of the Tribe, and thus afforded them the basis for the 
relief they seek in a federal forum. 
The question whether an Indian tribe retains the power to 
compel a non-Indian property owner to submit to the civil ju-
risdiction of a tribal court is one that must be answered by 
reference to federal law and is a "federal question" under 
§ 1331. 14 Because petitioners contend that federal law has di-
12 Thus, in recent years we have decided whether a tribe has the power 
to regulate the sale of liquor on a reservation, Rice v. Rehner, 463 U. S. 
713 (1983); the power to impose a severance tax on oil and gas production 
by non-Indian lessees, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U. S. 130 
(1982); the power to regulate hunting and fishing, Montana v. United 
States, 450 U. S. 544 (1981), Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Department of 
Game, 433 U. S. 165 (1977); and the power to tax the sale of cigarettes to 
non-Indians, Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Res-
ervation, 447 U. S. 134 (1980). 
18 See, e. g., Mescalaro Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973); cf. 
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136 (1980). 
14 We have recognized that federal law has sometimes diminished the in-
herent power of Indian tribes in significant ways. As we stated in United 
States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313, 322-326 (1978): 
i 
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vested the Tribe of this aspect of sovereignty, it is federal 
law on which they rely as a basis for the asserted right of 
freedom from Tribal Court interference. They have, there-
fore, filed an action "arising under" federal law within the 
meaning of § 1331. The District Court correctly concluded 
that a federal court may determine under § 1331 whether a 
tribal court has exceeded the lawful limits of its jurisdiction. 
II 
Respondents' contend that, even though the District 
Court's jurisdiction was properly invoked under § 1331, the 
Court of Appeals was correct in ordering that the complaint 
be dismissed because the petitioners failed to exhaust their 
remedies in the tribal judicial system. They further assert 
that the underlying tort action "has turned into a procedural 
and jurisdictional nightmare" because petitioners did not pur-
sue their readily available Tribal Court remedies. Petition-
ers, in response, relying in part on Oliphant v. Suquamish 
Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191 (1978), assert that resort to ex-
haustion as a matter of comity "is manifestly inappropriate." 
In Oliphant we held that the Suquamish Indian Tribal 
Court did not have criminal jurisdiction to try and to punish 
non-Indians for offenses committed on the Reservation. 
"Their incorporation within the territory of the United States, and their 
acceptance of its protection, necessarily divested them of some aspects of 
the sovereignty which they had previously exercised. . . . In sum, Indian 
tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or 
statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status. 
The areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held to 
have occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe 
and nonmembers of the tribe .... Thus, Indian tribes can no longer freely 
alienate to non-Indians the land they occupy. Oneida Indian Nation v. 
M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 574. They cannot enter into direct commercial or 
governmental relations with foreign nations. Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 
515, 559; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet., at 17-18; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 
Cranch 87, 147 (Johnson, J., concurring). And, as we have recently held, 
they cannot try nonmembers in tribal courts. Oliphant v. Suquamish In-
dian Tribe [435 U. S. 191 (1978)]." 
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That holding adopted the reasoning of early opinions of two 
United States Attorneys General, 15 and concluded that fed-
erallegislation conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts to 
try non-Indians for offenses committed in Indian Country had 
implicitly pre-empted tribal jurisdiction. We wrote: 
"While Congress never expressly forbade Indian tribes 
to impose criminal penalties on non-Indians, we now 
make express our implicit conclusion of nearly a century 
ago that Congress consistently believed this to be the 
necessary result of its repeated legislative actions." 435 
U. S., at 204. " 
If we were to apply the Oliphant rule here, it is plain that 
any exhaustion requirement would be completely foreclosed 
because federal courts would always be the only forums for 
civil actions against non-Indians. For several reasons, 
mor8e'le~the reasoning of Oliphant does not apply to this 
case. First, although Congress' decision to extend the crimi-
nal jurisdiction of the federal courts to offenses committed by 
non-Indians against Indians within Indian Country supported 
the holding in Oliphant, there is no comparable legislation 
granting the federal courts jurisdiction over civil disputes 
between Indians and non-Indians that arise on an Indian res-
ervation.16 Moreover, the opinion of one Attorney General 
16 We stated: 
"Faced by attempts of the Chocktaw Tribe to try non-Indian offenders in 
the early 1800's the United States Attorneys General also concluded that 
the Choctaws did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians absent 
congressional authority. See 2 Op. Atty. Gen. 693 (1834); 7 Op. Atty. 
Gen. 174 (1855). According to the Attorney General in 1834, tribal crimi-
nal jurisdiction over non-Indians is, inter alia, inconsistent with treaty 
provisions recognizing the sovereignty of the United States over the terri-
tory assigned to the Indian nation and the dependence of the Indians on the 
United States" 435 U. S., at 198-199. 
14 F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 253 (1982) ("The develop-
ment of principles governing civil jurisdiction in Indian Country has been 
markedly different from the development of rules dealing with criminal 
jurisdiction"). 
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on which we relied in Oliphant, specifically noted the differ-
ence between civil and criminal jurisdiction. Speaking of 
civil jurisdiction, Attorney General Cushing wrote : 
"But there is no provision of treaty, and no statute, 
which takes away from the Choctaws jurisdiction of a 
case like this, a question of property strictly internal to 
the Chocktaw nation; nor is there any written law which 
confers jurisdiction of such a case in any court of the 
United States .... 
The conclusion seems to me irresistible, not that such 
questions are justiciable no where, but that they remain 
subject to the local jurisdiction of the Chocktaws. 
Now, it is admitted on all hands . . . that Congress has 
'paramount right' to legislate in regard to this question, 
in all its relations. It has legislated, in so far as it saw 
fit, by taking jurisdiction in criminal matters, and omit-· 
ting to take jurisdiction in civil matters. . . . By all 
possible rules of construction the inference is clear that 
jurisdiction is left to the Choctaws themselves of civil 
controversies arising strictly within the Chocktaw Na-
tion." 7 Op. Att'y Gen.~, at 179:....181 (emphasis added). 17 
Thus, we conclude that the answer to the question whether 
a tribal court has the power to exercise civil subject-matter 
jurisdiction over non-Indians in a case of this kind is not auto-
matically forclosed, as an extension of Oliphant would re-
17 A leading treatise on Indian law suggests strongly that Congress has 
had a similar understanding: 
"In the civil field, however, Congress has never enacted general legislation 
to supply a federal or state forum for disputes between Indians and non-
Indians in Indian country. Furthermore, although treaties between the 
federal government and Indian tribes sometimes required the tribes to sur-
render non-Indian criminal offenders to state or federal authorities, Indian 
treaties did not contain provision for tribal relinquishment of civil jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians." !d., at 253-254. 
84-320-0PINION 
10 NATIONAL FARMERS UNION INS. CO. v. CROW TRIBE 
quire. 18 Rather, the existence and extent of a tribal court's 
jurisdiciton will require a careful examination of tribal sover-
eignty, the extent to which that sovereignty has been al-
tered, divested or diminished, 19 as well as a detailed study 
of relevant statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied in 
treaties and elsewhere, and adminstrative or judicial 
decisions. 
We believe that examination should be conducted in the 
first instance in the Tribal Court itself. Our cases have often 
recognized that Congress is committed to a policy of support-
ing tribal self-government and self-determination. 20 That 
policy favors a rule that will provide the forum whose juris-
diction is being challenged the first opportunity to evaluate 
the factual and legal bases for the challenge. 21 Moreover the 
orderly administration of justice in the federal court will be 
served by allowing a full record to be developed in the Tribal 
Court before either the merits or any question concerning ap-
propriate relief is addressed. 22 The risks of the kind of "pro-
18 Cf. Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971); Williams v. Lee, 
358 u. s. 217 (1959). 
19 See, e. g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 
331-332 (1983); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U. S. 130, 137 
(1982); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 
447 u. s. 134, 152 (1980). ' 
00 New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U. S. 324, 332 (1983); 
Merrion v. Jacarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U. S. 130, 138, n. 5 (1982); White 
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 143-144 & n. 10 (1980); 
Morton v. Mancuri, 417 U. S. 535, 551 (1974); Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 
217, 223 (1959). 
21 We do not suggest that exhaustion would be required where an asser-
tion of tribal jurisdiction "is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted 
in bad faith," cf. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S. 327, 338 (1977), or where the 
action is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions, or where 
exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity 
to challenge the court's jurisdiction. 
22 Four days after receiving notice of the default judgment, petitioners 
requested that the Di~trict Court enter an injunction. Crow Tribal Court 
Rule of Civil Procedure 17(d) provides that a party in a default may move 
to set aside the default judgment at any time within 30 days. App. 17 . 
.. ' - ,... ·' 
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cedural nightmare" that has allegedly developed in this case 
will be minimized if the federal court stays its hand until after 
the Tribal Court has had a full opportunity to determine its 
own jurisdiction 23 and to rectify any errors it may have 
made. 24 Exhaustion of Tribal Court remedies, moreover, 
will encourage Tribal Courts to explain to the parties the pre-
cise basis for accepting jurisdiction, and will also provide 
other courts with the benefit of their expertise in such mat-
ters in the event of further judicial review. 25 
III 
"' · 
Our conclusions that § 1331 encompasses the federal ques-
tion whether a tribal court has exceeded the lawful limits of 
its jurisdiction, and that exhaustion is required before such a 
claim may be entertained by a federal court, require that we 
reverse the of the Court of Appeals. Until petitioners have 
exhausted the remedies available to them in the tribal court 
system, supra, n. 4, it would be premature for a federal court 
to consider any relief. Whether the federal action should be 
dismissed, or merely held in abeyance pending the develop-
ment of further .Tribal Court proceedings, is a question that 
should be addressed in the first instance by the District 
Court. Accordingly, the judgment-of the Court of Appeals 
is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
It is so Ordered. 
Petitioners did not utilize this legal remedy. It is a fundamental principle 
of longstanding that a request for an injunction will not be granted as long 
as an adequate remedy at law is available. See, e. g., Rondeau v. Mosinee 
Paper Corp., 422 U. S. 49, 57 (1975); Sampson v. Murray, 415 U. S. 61, 88 
(1974). 
28 C. Wright, Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts § 16 (1976). 
24 Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 765 (1975). 
28 Weinberger v. Saifi,, 422 U. S., at 765; see, e. g., North Dakota ex rel. 
Wefald v. Kelly, 10 Indian L. Rep. 6059 (1983); Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. 
Buum, 10 Indian L. Rep. 6031 (1983). 
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